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Right Of An Employee To Refuse
Hazardous Work Under The
Occupational Safety And Health Act:
Does It Exist?
I. Introduction
Supported by an impressive collection of facts and figures relat-
ing to deaths and injuries occurring at the workplace,' and con-
cerned about occupational safety and health, Congress passed the
Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA] of 19702 with the
avowed purpose "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. . .. "I
Although Congressmen proclaimed the Act a panacea for the
hazards of the worksite,4 protection from occupational injury and
illness did not encompass the right of employees to walk off the job
because of potentially hazardous conditions at the workplace.5 Be-
lieving that this right was implied by the purpose of the Act and
aware that if this right did not exist workers would face the dilemma
of choosing between their health or their jobs,6 the Secretary of La-
1. A statistic often repeated in the legislative record was that during a four year period
more people died from work related incidents than were killed in ten years of United States
involvement in Vietnam. 116 CONG. REC. 38375 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (et seq.) (1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
4. Congressman Ayres stated in the debate on the final version of the Act, "This assures
• .. that our country will have taken a giant step forward in making the place where the
American worker spends a large part of his life, as safe and as healthful as human intelligence
and goodwill can make it." 116 CONG. REC. 42204 (1970).
5.
[RIeview of the Act and examination of the legislative history discloses that, as a
general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to
walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace. Hazardous
conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be corrected by the em-
ployer once brought to his attention. If corrections are not accomplished, or if there
is a dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee will normally have the
opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to Section 8(f) of the
Act, or seek the assistance of other public agencies which have responsibility in the
field of safety and health. Under such circumstances, therefore, an employer would
not ordinarily be in violation of Section 11(c) by taking action to discipline an em-
ployee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or
health hazards.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (1977).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1977).
bor, pursuant to his authority under the Act,7 promulgated a regula-
tion designed to fill this gap.' The regulation prohibits
discrimination against an employee who refuses in good faith to ex-
pose himself to dangerous working conditions, provided that the
condition be such that a reasonable person would conclude that a
danger of death or serious injury exists and that sufficient time is
unavailable to correct the situation through resort to the procedures
provided by the statute.9 Before leaving employment, the employee
must have unsuccessfully sought correction of the condition from his
employer. to
Employers have challenged the validity of this regulation. Four
courts have held the regulation to be invalid" and only one has sus-
tained its application. 2 Although the Secretary petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit Court
from its decision in Marshall v. Daniel Construction Company 3 that
the regulation was in conflict with the Act and, therefore, invalid, the
Supreme Court denied the petition.' 4
To overcome the presumption of validity to which the regula-
tion is entitled,'" a challenge to the regulation must be based upon
the premise that Congress never intended to grant that right. Thus,
the courts have naturally based their decisions upon an analysis of
the statutory scheme and legislative history of the act. An analysis of
7. "The Secretary . . . shall. . . prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out their responsibilities under this chapter. ... 29 U.S.C. § 6 57(g)( 2 )
(1976).
8.
However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice
between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or
death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no
reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous con-
dition, he would be protected against subsequent discrimination. The condition
causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that
a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would
conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is insuffi-
cient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort
to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the
employee, where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and been unable
to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1977).
9. Id.
10. Id.
!1. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
216 (1978); Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Usery v. Certified
Welding Corp., 6 O.S.H.C. 1142 (D. Wyo. 1977); Brennen v. Diamond Int'l. Corp., 5 O.S.H.C.
1049 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
12. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
13. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977).
14. 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
15. Courts must give great weight to the Secretary's interpretation of the requirements of
the Act and will sustain the validity of his regulations if they are "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation." Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 710 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973), and Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501
(5th Cir. 1974)).
the provisions for handling emergency situations included in the Act
and the circumstances surrounding its passage support the majority
decision that the right to refuse hazardous work without discrimina-
tion does not exist under the Act.
II. Legislative History of the Act
From a myriad of occupational safety and health bills intro-
duced into Congress over previous years, three bills emerged that
played a major role in the passage of the Act: the Daniels Bill 16 and
Steiger Bill 7 in the United States House of Representatives and the
Williams Bill 8 in the United States Senate.
A. The House Version of the Act
The Daniels Bill and the Steiger Bill were both brought to the
floor of the House. 9 The committee on Education and Labor sup-
ported the Daniels Bill, but the Rules Committee reported the Stei-
ger Bill to the floor as a suggested substitute for the Daniels Bill.
20
The bills differed in the remedies available for workers exposed
to safety and health hazards. The Daniels Bill originally contained a
provision that permitted employees exposed to toxic substances to
absent themselves from work with pay if the conditions were not
corrected.2t A second provision authorized the issuance of adminis-
trative orders by an inspector forbidding the presence of employees
at the work site under conditions presenting a danger of death or
serious injury.22 In contrast, the Steiger Bill contained no provision
entitling employees to refuse to work because of dangerous condi-
tions, and it required a court order to enjoin business operations
when an imminent danger situation existed.2 3
When the Daniels Bill encountered opposition on the floor of
the House, Congressman Daniels offerred amendments to the un-
popular provisions in an attempt to gain support for his bill. He
deleted the provision entitling workers to absent themselves with pay
and substituted a provision that permitted employees who believed
there was a violation of a health standard that threatened physical
harm or believed imminent danger existed, to request a special in-
16. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
17. H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 38394-402 (1970).
18. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1.
19. H.R. RES. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 38366 (1970).
20. A minority of the Committee on Education and Labor had sponsored the Steiger Bill
as a nonpartisan compromise measure.
21. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(a)(5) (1970), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
755-56.
22. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 12(a) (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
893, 955-56.
23. H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 38394-402 (1970).
spection by the secretary upon notification of the perceived danger.24
Daniels second amendment to his bill removed the authority of in-
spectors to issue administrative closing orders in imminent danger
situations. His new provision required the secretary to apply to the
courts for a temporary restraining order or an injunction.25 The
amendment was intended to placate the fear that inspectors might
abuse their power to shut down business operations. Despite these
attempts to make his bill more acceptable by reducing the protection
afforded to workers, the House adopted the Steiger Bill.26
B. The Senate Version of the Act
The Williams Bill, the Senate version of the Act, contained a
provision that permitted employees to contact the Secretary of Labor
and request a special inspection if they believed an imminent danger
existed. If the Secretary found that there were reasonable grounds to
believe the condition existed, he was to conduct the inspection as
soon as practical.27 The bill also provided for an application by the
Secretary to a district court for a temporary restraining order or an
injunction, subsequent to an inspection, when an imminent danger
was believed to exist.2 8 Upon the Secretary's determination that suf-
ficient time was unavailable to obtain a court order, he was empow-
ered to issue an order, effective for a maximum of seventy-two
hours,2 9 to remedy the situation. The committee reporting the bill
added a provision requiring inspectors who intended to issue these
orders under authority delegated to them by the Secretary to obtain
the concurrence of a regional Labor Department official before issu-
ing the order3" because "it should not be within the sole judgment of
a single inspector to determine whether a hazard is so imminent as to
warrant interference with a production operation.
' '3 1
When the Williams Bill was reported to the Senate floor it con-
fronted opposition similar to that met by the Daniels Bill in the
House. To escape comparisons with the Daniels Bill, Senator Wil-
liams stated that his bill did not contain the unpopular strike-with-
pay provision, which had proved unacceptable in the House. Fur-
24. Amendment No. 3 to H.R. 16785, 116 CONG. REc. 38377 (1970).
25. Amendment No. 4 to H.R. 16785, 116 CONG. REC. 38378 (1970).
26. 116 CONG. REC. 38715 (1970). The roll call vote passing the bill is recorded at 116
CONG. REC. 38723-24 (1970).
27. S. 2193, § 8(0(1), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 529,
550.
28. Id. § I l(a), discussed at [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5211.
29. Id. § 11(b), discussedat [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5212.
30. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5177, 5189 (Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare).
31. Id. at 5189-90. Although the committee added this provision, the committee mem-
bers still intended that relief should be available as fast as possible. The committee report
stated its intention that the employee's initial request and a regional officer's concurrence in an
inspector's closing order could both be accomplished by telephone. Id. at 5190.
thermore, Williams pointed out that instead of providing employees
that right, his bill gave employees the right to request a special in-
spection of the working conditions.32
C Conference Committee's Final Version
The two bills that were adopted by their respective houses pro-
ceeded to the conference committee for resolution of their differing
provisions. Neither bill provided workers with the right to absent
themselves from dangerous working conditions, and provisions
granting that right with pay had been expressly rejected. The short-
cut remedy that had been proposed for worker protection in immi-
nent danger situations met its demise when the Senate provision
permitting administrative orders to cease operations under these
conditions was deleted in favor of the House provision that permit-
ted only the courts to interfere with business operations. 33 Thus, the
final version of the Act passed by both the House and the Senate
provided recourse to the courts as the sole remedy to imminent dan-
ger situations.
34
III. Court Rulings on the Validity of the Regulation
4. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Company
The most extensive court review of the regulation was provided
in Marshall v. Daniel Construction Company." The Secretary filed a
complaint in the district court alleging that a worker had been dis-
charged in violation of Section 11 (c)(1)36 of the Act for exercising his
right under the regulation. Jimmy Simpson had been employed as a
structural steel worker connecting heavy steel beams with the aid of
a crane. On the day of his dismissal, Simpson and his crew were
working one hundred and fifty feet in the air in high winds and re-
turned to the ground because of the dangerous wind velocity. When
Simpson refused to obey the orders of the foreman to return to work,
he was fired. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to
32. Senator Williams stated,
I should also add, despite some widespread contentions to the contrary, that the com-
mittee bill does not contain a so-called strike-pay provision. Rather than raising a
possibility for endless disputes over whether employees were entitled to walk off the
job with full pay, it was decided in committee to enhance the prospects of compliance
by the employer through such means as giving the employees the right to request a
special Labor Department investigation or inspection.
116 CONG. REC. 37326 (1970).
33. CONF. REP. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5236.
34. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 13; 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
35. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1) (1976) provides, "No person shall discharge or in any manner
discriminate against any employee... because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of
himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter."
state a claim upon which relief can be granted,37 and the circuit court
affirmed upon its finding that Congress had not intended the Act to
afford the right granted by the Secretary's regulation.38
1. Examination of the Statutory Scheme.-In ruling upon the
validity of the regulation, the circuit court compared the procedures
for counteracting imminent dangers provided by the Act with the
shortcut provision embodied in the regulation. The court declared
that four independent judgments regarding the existence of immi-
nent danger must be made before the presence of workers in the area
may be prohibited.39 First, the Secretary or his representative must
decide that the worker's notice provides reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that an imminent danger exists. Second, the inspector must de-
termine upon inspection that the condition cannot be corrected
through normal enforcement procedures but warrants immediate in-
junctive relief. Third, the Secretary must conclude that the inspector
is correct and seek an injunction. Last, the district court must decide
that imminent danger exists and that injunctive relief is required.' °
The circuit court noted, "At no point does the Act permit workers to
make a determination that a dangerous condition exists in fact and
that their employment or their employer's business operations may
be halted by their refusal to work."'"
2. Analysis of the Legislative History.-The court in Daniel
Construction Company also based its conclusion that the regulation
was invalid on its examination of the legislative history of the Act.
One fact the court found persuasive was that despite the amend-
ments made by Congressman Daniels to his bill, the House adopted
the Steiger Bill.42 The court also called attention to Senator Wil-
liams' statement that his bill did not contain a strike-with-pay provi-
sion and instead workers were given other protection such as the
right to request a special investigation by the Labor Department.43
The changes made to the original bills of both the House and
the Senate with regard to the imminent danger situations further
supported the court's decision.44 These alterations convinced the
court that Congress intended to grant no one except a federal district
court the right to disrupt the operations of a business.4 5 The court
concluded, therefore, that the regulation was invalid because it con-
37. 563 F.2d at 709.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 711.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 712.
43. Id. at 713 see note 32 supra.
44. Id. at 713-15.
45. Id.
ferred a right upon the employee that Congress had deliberately de-
nied to an inspector and chose to grant only to the courts. 6
B. Usery v. Babcock and Wilcox Company
The only decision upholding the regulation is Usery v. Babcock
and Wilcox Company,47 in which the district court held that the reg-
ulation was not inconsistent with the purpose of the Act and would
not undercut normal enforcement channels because the right only
arises when regular procedures are inadequate.4 In analyzing the
legislative history of the Act, the district court found that the strike-
with-pay provision deleted from the original Daniels Bill was not
commensurate to a right of workers to refuse to work in an immi-
nently dangerous environment without pay.49
The Babcock court questioned the significance of Congress' re-
jection of provisions permitting administrative shutdowns in immi-
nent danger situations and noted a considerable difference between
the authority to shut down an entire plant and the right of a few
endangered employees to refuse to work. That the deletion of a pro-
vision authorizing an administratively ordered shutdown precluded
the right of employees to refuse hazardous work was an argument
the court found to be unclear and unacceptable. °
In contrast to the circuit court's finding in Daniel Construction
Company, the district court in Babcock determined that the legisla-
tive history was ambiguous at best.5 In the absence of an express
refusal by Congress to grant employees the right contained in the
regulation, the court believed that the policy reasons against present-
ing an employee with the Hobson's choice of choosing between his
job and his health required sustaining the validity of the regula-
46.
The Secretary's regulation before the court today is designed to achieve an end
consistent with the purposes of the Act. Yet it expressly confers upon employees a
right that Congress deliberately chose not to grant to OSHA inspectors: the right to
determine infact that an employment practice or condition presents 'a real danger of
death or physical injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the
situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory procedures
.. .. 'Moreover, by permitting employees to refuse work upon making such a deter-
mination, the regulation provides them authority equivalent to that of an OSHA in-
spector when issuing an administrative stop work order-a right which Congress also
deliberately withheld from OSHA inspectors.
Id. at 714-5.
47. 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
48. Id. at 756.
49. Id. at 756-57. The court assumes that the worker is not entitled to payment under the
regulation even though the regulation is silent on that issue. Judge Wisdom in his dissent in
Marshall v. Daniel Construction Company makes the same assumption. The argument may be
made, however, that it would be proper to require that the employee be paid because he would
be entitled to back pay if he was fired for exercising a right afforded by the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(c)(2) (1976). If the regulation is valid, the worker is exercising a right afforded by the
Act, and failure to pay him may be deemed discrimination because of his exercise of that right.
50. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
51. Id. at 757.
tion.52
C Dissent in Daniel Construction Company
The dissent in Daniel Construction Company, authored by Judge
Wisdom, provides an analysis more extensive than the Babcock de-
cision for upholding the validity of the regulation. Judge Wisdom
regarded the regulation as an attempt to provide a solution to the
dilemma created when the procedures provided by the Act for immi-
nent dangers cannot work fast enough to provide employees with the
necessary protection.5 3 The Judge found the right to refuse hazard-
ous work embodied in the implicit right to safe working conditions,54
and the regulation, therefore, contained a right that was afforded by
the Act. Furthermore, Judge Wisdom believed the right provided by
the regulation was implied in the anti-discrimination provisions of
the Act, which prohibit discrimination against any employee who
exercises any right afforded by the Act.55
Moreover, Judge Wisdom's interpretation of the legislative his-
tory conflicted with the majority's conclusions in Daniel Construction
Company. He pointed out that the strike-with-pay provision in the
original Daniels Bill dealt only with exposure to toxic substances and
did not require an imminent danger to life. 6 His position comports
with the district court's reasoning in Babcock that the deletion of this
provision, which allowed workers to walk off the job for less than
imminent danger, did not require the conclusion that Congress in-
tended workers to be forced to continue working under hazardous
conditions or take the risk of discharge for leaving when faced with
impending harm.
Finally, Judge Wisdom also agreed with the court in Babcock
that administrative orders closing plants differed significantly from
employee refusals to work. The difference lies in the effect on pro-
duction from closing an entire plant as compared to the effects from
an employee walkout. A plant closing could also be initiated by gov-
52. Id. at 758.
53. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 718 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 216 (1978).
54. Judge Wisdom found the right to safe working conditions in § 654 of the Act, which
provides, "Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). 563 F.2d at
718.
55. Id.
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee be-
cause such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself
or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
56. 563 F.2d at 719.
ernment action, but a work boycott would be the result of private
action." The refusal to work by employees would not raise ques-
tions concerning due process and governmental neutrality between
labor and management, which are problems inherent in governmen-
tal action that results in plant closings. 8
D. Analysis of the Arguments in Babcock
L Effect of Employee Walkouts.-The assumption made by
Judge Wisdom and the Babcock court that administrative orders
shutting down business operations significantly differ from employee
refusals to work are not necessarily accurate. The Act states that a
court may restrain any conditions or practices that have led to the
existence of the imminent danger and may order employers to take
whatever steps necessary to avoid the danger.5 9 An injunction,
therefore, could be issued with orders so detailed that the effect on
production would be no different than if employees refused to work.
Congress could have placed similar limitations upon the admin-
istrative orders offered as a remedy for imminent danger conditions,
but it did not find these restrictions adequate and declined to grant
such power to inspectors. Since Congress refused to grant this lim-
ited power to interfere with production to an impartial inspector, it is
unlikely that they intended to grant employees, who are interested
parties, the equally broad right to interfere with production provided
by the Secretary's regulation. Instead, Congress decided to confer
this power only upon district courts.
Since Congress intended that only the courts should have au-
thority to interrupt production, the district court's finding in Bab-
cock that the regulation would not undercut normal enforcement
procedures is difficult to support. Once the inspector informs the
workers that imminent danger exists,60 the employees, having the
good faith, reasonable belief that an imminent danger existed as re-
quired by the regulation, could walk off the job with protection from
discharge or discrimination. Since this procedure achieves faster re-
57. Id. at 720.
58. Id. at 721.
59.
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction, upon petition of the
Secretary, to restrain any conditions orpractices in anyplace ofemployment which are
such that a danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death or seri-
ous physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be elimi-
nated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by this chapter. Any
order issued under this section may require such steps to be taken as may be necessary
to avoid, correct, or remove such imminent danger and prohibit the employment or
presence of any individual in locations or under conditions where such imminent
danger exists . ...
29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
60. An inspector is required to give notice to the employees if he finds that an imminent
danger exists. 29 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1976).
suits than applying for a court order, it would encourage inspectors
to circumvent the use of the courts for an injunction, which is the
procedure Congress thought to be necessary.
2. Congressional Concern for Administrative Shutdowns.-
Judge Wisdom discounted the significance of Congress' rejection of
provisions permitting administrative closing orders when imminent
danger conditions existed, and he attributed the rejection to the lack
of Congressional familiarity with administrative shutdowns.6' Con-
gress, however, has never considered administrative closing orders to
be unusual, as indicated by the passing of the Coal Mines Safety and
Health Act,62 which permitted an inspector to issue an order requir-
ing the withdrawal of all employees from an area of the mine where
an imminent danger exists.63 Moreover, the Senate Committee Re-
port that accompanied the Williams Bill mentioned that thirty-five
states authorize administrative officials to deal with imminent dan-
ger situations by issuing stop work orders;' Congressman Daniels
also noted the predominance of this remedy in the House debate.65
Thus, an administrative closing order was not a novel Congressional
concept.
Judge Wisdom also attributed the rejection of the provision to
the concern that administrative orders would violate due process.
66
The enactment of the Coal Mines Safety and Health Act, which per-
mitted administrative closing orders,67 and the Senate passage of the
Williams Bill, which contained a similar provision, however, clearly
illustrate that Congressional rejection of these provisions was not
based on due process concerns or Congressional unfamiliarity with
similar provisions.
3. Congressional Concern for Swft Correction of Dangerous
Conditions.-Although Judge Wisdom correctly proffered that the
strike-with-pay provision rejected by Congress is not the same as a
right to refuse work without pay, no evidence exists that Congress
intended employees to have the right to refuse work when the condi-
tions may be dangerous.68 Congress did, however, provide an elabo-
61. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 722 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 216 (1978).
62. 30 U.S.C. § 801-960 (1976).
63. 30 U.S.C.A. § 817(a) (West Supp. 1979) (amending 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1976)).
64. S. REp. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5177, 5190.
65. 116 CONG. REC. 38378 (1970).
66. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 216 (1978).
67. 30 U.S.C.A. § 817(a) (West Supp. 1979).
68. The House of Representatives considered this right during debates on the floor. Con-
gressman Cohelan, while speaking in support of the Daniels Bill, stated,
[A] comprehensive occupational safety and health program must be based on the
rate procedure to be followed in handling imminent danger
situations.69 During the evolution of the Act, provisions that would
have resulted in more expeditious solutions to imminent dangers
were rejected.7" Instead, Congress increased the number of steps
necessary to obtain relief and, consequently, lengthened the time re-
quired to gain that relief. This record reflects that Congress never
intended the shortcut procedure permitted by the regulation to exist
under the Act.7
Examination of another provision of the Act likewise indicates
that Congress did not intend to adopt the most expeditious proce-
dure for the correction of conditions that are found to be unsafe.
When a violation of the Act occurs but no imminent danger of death
or serious injury exists, citations may be issued and the employer
may be required to correct the condition within a period of time set
by the inspector. The abatement period does not begin to run, how-
ever, even when immediate correction is ordered, until after a final
order by the Occupational Health and Safety Commission has been
issued.72 Although the conditions to which the workers are exposed
during the commission's proceedings are not deemed imminently
dangerous, Congress certainly realized that in the interim workers
individual rights of the worker. It must permit the worker to leave his post whenever
and wherever conditions exist that endanger his health or safety. . . . Therefore,
passage of this measure before this Chamber today is 'ital and necessary as all of
these aspects of a comprehensive safety and health program [are] provided for in
H.R. 16735 [sic].
116 CONG. REC. 38375 (1970). The Daniels Bill, however, was replaced by the Steiger Bill.
See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976) (issuance of an injunction
upon the Secretary's petition). See also note 59 supra.
The Labor Department has provided procedural guidelines that are to be followed upon a
receipt of a request for inspection of an imminent danger condition. The inspections are to be
thoroughly planned but made as soon as possible. Imminent danger inspections are given top
priority, and weekends and holidays are not to interfere with the expeditious handling of the
case. The inspection is to be conducted within twenty-four hours unless there are extraordi-
nary circumstances, in which case advance notice of the inspection may be given if it is con-
cluded that it will speed the elimination of the hazard. Voluntary elimination of the hazard is
encouraged, and court action is to be sought only if the employer does not give adequate
assurance of immediate elimination of the hazard. [1977 Reference Binder] 2 Occup. SAFETY
& HEALTH REP. (BNA) 77:3301-3303 (OSHA Field Operations Manual).
70. For the legislative history of the rejected provisions and the reasons for their rejec-
tion, see notes 21-34 and accompanying text supra.
71.
The contention that section 13 (29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976)) gives rise to an implied
employee right to engage in work stoppages is inapposite. Section 13 provides a rem-
edy through the courts, not a right to self-help. The initial determination of whether
an imminent danger exists is made by an inspector from the Department of Labor,
which is then authorized to seek relief in the courts. Employees have no right under
OSHA to make such a determination or to seek relief in the courts on their own.
Tobin, OSHA, Section 301 and the NLRB: Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Rights, 23 AM. U.L.
REv. 837, 851-53 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1976). If an employer contests the citation, employees will con-
tinue to be exposed to the danger that prompted the issuance of the citation. Expedient relief,
therefore, is not provided even when there is objective evidence of a danger.
would be exposed to unsafe conditions, which indicates that Con-
gress did not believe that speed was of the essence.
As time passed during Congress' consideration of the Act, sup-
port for prompt action in response to imminent dangers decreased,
and the support for elaborate procedures increased. The legislative
history of the Act evinces this change in priorities and provides no
support for the conclusion that Congress intended to provide the ul-
timate shortcut remedy that the Secretary's regulation grants to em-
ployees.
IV. Analogy to Other Federal Acts
A. Judge Wisdom's Analogy to Other Acts
In his dissent in Daniel Construction Company, Judge Wisdom
found support for an implied right to refuse hazardous work in
rights granted to workers under other acts passed by Congress. He
maintained that the right to walk off the job when the working con-
ditions are dangerous could not have caused Congressional concern
because Congress had already granted a similar right to employees"
under Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act.74 The
Secretary's regulation, therefore, posed no new threat to employers.75
Moreover, Congress was aware that this right already existed be-
cause Section 502 was mentioned in the debates.76 Judge Wisdom
believed that in the absence of an express denial of the right in the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the previous acceptance of the
concept by Congress supported the conclusion that the regulation
was not in conflict with the Congressional intent.77
1. Section ,502 of the Labor Management Relations Act.-
Under Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act an em-
ployee may refuse to work under abnormally dangerous working
conditions and this refusal shall not be deemed a strike.78 This pro-
73. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 216 (1978).
74. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 502; 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
75. 563 F.2d at 721.
76. Judge Wisdom cited 116 CONG. REc. 42208 as the location of the reference made to
Section 502 in the debate on the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The only men-
tion of the Section, however, was by Congressman Scherle who predicted that the posting of
citations, as required by the Act, would be used by labor as an excuse to stage a walkout under
Section 502. Scherle did not imply that a right similar to this section existed under the Act.
On the contrary, his statement that the walkouts would occur under the color of Section 502
indicates that he did not believe that a walkout could be protected under the Act. The right
provided under § 502 is more limited than the right created by the Secretary's regulation. If
Congressman Scherle thought the right granted by the Secretary existed under the Act, he
would not have been concerned about possible walkouts under § 502. Instead, his protests
would have been directed at this right that the Secretary finds implied by the Act.
77. 563 F.2d at 721-22.
78. "[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because
tection is important only when there is a no-strike provision in the
collective bargaining agreement between employees and manage-
ment.79 By invoking Section 502 rights, employees who refused to
work under abnormally dangerous conditions would not be dis-
charged for violating the contract because their work stoppage would
not be considered a strike.80
This right is limited, however, by judicial interpretation of the
requirement that the employees act upon a good faith belief that the
working conditions are abnormally dangerous. The interpretation of
what constitutes "good faith" has circumscribed the protection pro-
vided by the section because the courts have held that the evidence
must show in fact that the conditions were abnormally dangerous
before employees who refuse to work are granted the protections af-
forded by Section 502. A reasonable belief fails to meet this stan-
dard.8 Further narrowing of the protection results from the express
language of the statute that the conditions must be found to be ab-
normally dangerous. Thus, work that was initially dangerous must,
by the occurrence of some special condition, become even more haz-
ardous.
82
Furthermore, even the limited protection provided by Section
502 is lost if the collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitra-
tion of safety and health disputes. A walkout for safety reasons
under a contract containing a mandatory arbitration clause could be
enjoined as a contract violation even though the requirements for
protection under the Section are met. 3 Section 502, therefore, pro-
vides no protection to employees even in imminent danger situations
if their contract calls for arbitration under these circumstances.
For these reasons, Judge Wisdom's analogy to Section 502 as
evidence that worker self-help remedies are not unusual is not en-
tirely accurate. The right is read very narrowly by the courts and
can be lost by including arbitration provisions in the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Thus, Judge Wisdom presents an anomalous sit-
of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or
employees be deemed a strike under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
79. Ashford & Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions- Employee Rights Under the Labor
Management Relations Act and the Occupational Safety & Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW.
802, 816 (1977). When a no-strike provision is not included in the contract, § 7 of the Labor
Management Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)] provides broader protection to workers.
Under § 7, a strike over safety and health conditions is a protected activity. NLRB v. Wash-
ington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Under this section no requirement exists that the
conditions be abnormally dangerous. See Ashford & Katz, supra at 804; Atleson, Threats to
Health and Safety. Employee Self Help Under the NLRA4, 59 MINN. L. REv. 647, 658-59
(1975).
80. NLRB v. Knight Morely Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
927 (1958).
81. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974).
82. NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964).
83. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
uation in which he finds an implied right that affords broader
protection to employees than is provided by the express right that he
looks to for support for his conclusion. 4
2. Coal Mine Safety and Health Act.-In support of his dis-
senting opinion in Daniel Construction Company, Judge Wisdom
also drew an analogy to the provision in the Coal Mines Safety and
Health Act that protect workers from employer discrimination in re-
taliation for their exercise of rights provided by that Act.85 He im-
plied that the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in Phillios v.
Board of Mine Operation Appeals86 and Munsey v. Morton87 ruled
that the Act would protect employees who refused to work because
of unsafe working conditions.88 A close reading of the opinions,
however, reveals that Judge Wisdom misinterpreted the decisions.
The only statement in Phillos that recognized the right of an em-
ployee to refuse to work under conditions he believed hazardous to
his health or safety,89 referred to rights under a collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and employees rather than to
rights under the Coal Mines Safety and Health Act.90 In the subse-
quent decision in Munsey the court mistakenly inferred that Phillis
was precedent for the belief that the right to refuse work was statu-
tory in nature.9' Moreover, because Phillips was decided on a differ-
ent point, any statement by the court concerning employees' rights to
refuse hazardous work was dictum.92
84. Tobin, supra note 71, at 861.
85. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 718 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 216 (1978).
86. 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
87. 507 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
88. 563 F.2d at 719.
89. "It is conceded by Respondent that, pending a resolution of a safety or health com-
plaint, a miner at the Kencor Mine had the right to refuse work under conditions which he
believed in good faith to be hazardous to his health or safety." Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 780 n.29.
91. Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202, 1209 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It should be noted
that Phillips and Munsey were decided by different panels in the same circuit.
92. The Coal Mines Safety and Health Act contains no express right of employees to
refuse to work even in imminent danger situations, but it does contain a provision similar to
the one in the Occupational Safety and Health Act prohibiting discrimination against workers
for exercising their rights under the Act. 30 U.S.C.A. § 815(c) (1) (West Supp. 1979) (amend-
ing 30 U.S.C. § 820(b) (1) (1956)). The court in Phillips decided the case under this section by
finding that the notification of a foreman is the first step in the complaint procedure and,
therefore, protects the worker from discharge. Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations
Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975). Thus, the court
did not have to make a decision on an employee's right to refuse hazardous work under the
act.
V. Consequences of Invalidating the Regulation
A. Congress' Decision to Omit the Right to Refuse Hazardous
Work
The strongest argument supporting the validity of the Secre-
tary's regulation is that it avoids the Hobson's choice that faces the
employee if he is forced to choose between his job and his health.
While the purpose served by the Act to prevent occupational injuries
is laudable, opinions differ as to the extent to which legislation
should be used to achieve that goal. Judge Wisdom and the Secre-
tary appear to believe that Congress intended to provide employees
with every protection necessary to avoid injury. Congress, however,
does not make its decisions in a vacuum and the legislative history of
the Act evinces that competing interest groups, such as business en-
terprises, were instrumental in formulating the scope of the Act.93
Faced with these competing pressures and concerned with the possi-
ble effect of comprehensive regulation of occupational safety and
health upon the economy, Congress probably felt constrained to
limit employee protection to the safeguards and procedures included
in the Act; it is evident that Congress was not ready to give all avail-
able protection to workers.94 Perhaps Congress intended that em-
ployees seek any extra protection through collective bargaining with
management or hoped that the penalties included in the Act would
provide sufficient incentive to employers to insure their cooperation.
B. Alternate Remedies
. Contractual Safeguards.-A collective bargaining agree-
ment between labor and management could provide even greater
protection to employees than the Act provides.9" The contract could
provide that whenever workers felt that hazardous conditions existed
they would be permitted to stop working upon notifying a manage-
ment representative of the perceived danger. The contract could re-
quire an investigation by an OSHA inspector or some other
93. The remarks by Congressman Daniels about business' concern over administrative
closing orders indicates the effect that business groups had in the rejection of that provision by
Congress. 116 CONG. REC. 38378 (1970).
94. Congress expressly rejected provisions that would have given employers greater pro-
tection. See notes 21-33 and accompanying text supra.
95.
Self-preservation always prevails, and workers will continue to walk off the job
when they think they are in danger. But the decision to remove oneself from a dan-
gerous situation is an intuitive reaction qualified by experience and observation, and
the decision might be delayed if one realizes his livelihood could be lost if a wrong
decision is made. Therefore, maximum protection is provided for employees when
they have clothed themselves in contractual clauses that require speedy but knowl-
edgeable determination of their insistence that working conditions are dangerous
without any penalty for being wrong.
Note, Labor Law--Safety Disputes-Walkouts Under Section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 76
W. VA. L. REV. 57, 71 (1973).
impartial party experienced in occupational safety if the employer
disagreed with employees about the dangerousness of the working
conditions. If the person conducting the inspection found that haz-
ardous conditions justifying a work stoppage did exist, employees
would be entitled to compensation for the period that they are idle.
The financial impact upon the employer could be softened by per-
mitting reassignment of the workers to other jobs while the inspec-
tion and correction of the condition took place.96 If the inspector
concluded that no hazard exists or that none exists to an extent that
justifies interference with production, the employees would be re-
quired to return to work without entitlement to compensation for the
idle time.
Workers who perform jobs essential to the operation of the
plant may have difficulty in securing such provisions in a contract
since their refusal to work would in effect result in a shutdown of the
plant. In this situation, a possible protection would be retention of
the right to strike over safety conditions,97 but this provision would
probably be even less acceptable to employers than the right of a few
employees to absent themselves from dangerous working conditions.
If the employer insists upon a no-strike provision in the contract, an
express statement that safety disputes are nonarbitrable would leave
the workers their limited right under Section 502, although they
would run the risk that a court would later find that abnormally dan-
gerous conditions did not exist in fact.98
2. Use of Civil Penalties as an Incentive for Employer Coopera-
tion.-Provisions for civil penalties, which already exist in the Act,
may be utilized to provide an incentive to employers to remove
workers from imminent danger conditions prior to the Secretary's
obtaining a court order. Section 5 of the Act provides that employ-
ers are required to furnish to employees a place of employment free
from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical
harm.99 Willful or repeated violation of this requirement may result
in a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation.1t°
Failure to correct hazardous conditions subsequent to notification by
employees or by an inspector of the existence of the condition010 or
to remove employees from the area would seem to be a willful viola-
96. A similar provision is included in the collective bargaining agreement between the
United Mine Workers and the Bituminous Coal Operations Association, The National Bitumi-
nous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968.
97. Ashford & Katz, supra note 79, at 816.
98. "[E]mployees act with the risk that a later tribunal, not affected by the 'heat' of the
situation or personally endangered by the peril, will find the danger only 'normal.'" Atleson,
supra note 79, at 688.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976).
101. An inspector is required to notify both employees and employers of the danger if he
tion calling for the penalty provided. The threat of this penalty may
be sufficient incentive to the employer to gain his cooperation until
regular statutory enforcement procedures can be utilized.
3. Amending the Act.-The ultimate, and possibly least avail-
able solution is an amendment to the Act by Congress expressly
granting to employees the right contained in the Secretary's regula-
tion. o2 If Congress proves to be in opposition to providing this pro-
tection, the previously mentioned alternatives will still be available.
VI. Conclusion
One factor that the courts have overlooked in their discussion of
the issue is that prior to the enactment of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 the right granted by the Secretary's regula-
tion was not even implied to exist. The enactment by Congress of
provisions intended to provide safeguards for employees in an effort
to reduce occupational injury did not require Congress to include
every safeguard that employees would like to possess. The Act pro-
vides workers with greater rights than they had before its enactment
even without the right that the regulation seeks to provide.
When an imminent danger of death or serious injury exists,
however, the Act provides no remedy other than a court ordered in-
junction. If Jimmy Simpson wants to leave his perch on that narrow
steel beam one hundred and fifty feet in the air because he fears
being blown off by the strong wind, he should utilize the protections
provided by Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act or
the protections available through various contractual provisions.
Any protection he seeks will not lie in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act.
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concludes that an imminent danger condition exists. He also must inform them that he is
recommending to the Secretary that injunctive relief be sought. 29 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1976).
102. Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Marshall v. Daniel Construction
Company the Secretary announced that he was going to seek an amendment to the Act which
would grant workers the right included in his regulation.

